Narrative form and content in remembering by Wagoner, Brady
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Narrative form and content in remembering
Wagoner, Brady
Published in:
Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science
Publication date:
2008
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Wagoner, B. (2008). Narrative form and content in remembering. Integrative Psychological & Behavioral
Science, 315-323.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: December 25, 2020
COMMENTARY
Narrative Form and Content in Remembering
Brady Wagoner
Published online: 4 September 2008
# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008
Abstract Narrative is the primary medium through which experience is represented,
remembered and shared with others. It has the tendency to unify experience in an
abstract linear form. The degree to which this is done is designated narrative form. Mori
uses a multidimensional single case analysis to explore how the form of a narrative
differs between an experience of real contact with the environment and an experience
communicated by another or a ‘real’ experience repeated several times in con-
versation. I commend Mori’s experimental setup as modeling everyday life activities
and for arriving at a theory that applies to all cases. However, I argue (using data from
my own experiment on narrative and remembering) that the idiographic approach can
be fruitfully supplemented with (1) an analysis of the sample as a whole and (2)
narrative content in addition to form.
Keywords Narrative . Remembering . Content . Form . Single case analysis .
Aggregate analysis
It is well established that experience is represented, remembered and shared through
narrative. Since narrative is always guided by a symbol system for relating and
connecting events, narrative construction is “an implicit social act” (Gergen and
Gergen 1997, p. 176)—it helps the person make sense of their own experience
and communicate it to others (Chase 1995). Because of its symbolic, meaning-
making, and communicative properties, narrative functions as the water we swim in
as cultural beings, the collective coin, the vehicle of common sense. Like other
‘mediational means’ (e.g. a knot on a rope, a picture card or the memory technique
of ‘chunking’), narrative media shape our experience in particular directions. In
narrative, experience is integrated into an abstracted linear form, as opposed to, for
example, the concrete immediacy of an image.
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At the same time, we cannot forget that there is an ‘irreducible tension’ (Wertsch
2002) between ‘mediational means,’ such as narrative, and the agents who use it. Not
everyone will have equally mastered their use, nor will they use them to the same
ends. In Mori’s experiment we see that embodied experience at first only partially
comes under the control of narrative—it retains much of the form of the original
experience, mainly ‘alternation’ between person and world, unstable descriptions of
objects, and an expression of motives for action. In time, however, with repeated
telling of the narrative, it becomes increasingly conventional, linear, unified and
stable. At this point it resembles the narration of experiences conveyed to us by
another—in Mori’s (2008) experiment the narrative of University B.
In this commentary, I will develop Mori’s (2008) insights into narrative form and its
relationship to narrative content using my own experimental data. I will argue that
research in remembering can be greatly advanced by using the idiographic metho-
dology, used by Mori, along with an analysis of the sample as a whole. But before
proceeding further in this direction I will first consider the place of Mori’s
methodology more generally in memory research.
Re-membering Methodology
The psychological study of remembering has long been limited by an impoverished
methodology. Experimentalists have typically followed Ebbinghaus’s example of
constraining participants to a high degree. A prototypical scenario involves sedentary
participants passively exposed to some near meaningless material, for which they are
to later give a restricted reproduction. This setup bars us from studying the
transformation of experience in remembering as a meaningful social process. Instead,
it encourages us to think of memories as marks made on the mind, for which any
memory that deviates from the original object is labeled “distortion” or simply “false”
memory.
Mori (2008) breaks through these limitations in his synthesis of Gibonsian
(ecological) with a Bartlettian (sociocultural) experimental traditions. Gibson famously
critiqued the study of perception by way of immobile participants and introduced the
body into psychology, while Bartlett criticized Ebbinghaus’s use of meaningless,
uncontextualized material replacing it with complex narratives. Both of them
attempted to orient psychology to the study of real individuals (as opposed to
aggregates of individuals) involved in everyday activities with real objects, as active
experiencing bodies engaged in a social and physical environment.
Following these research traditions, Mori’s (2008) experiment is phenomenologi-
cally very close to everyday conversations about local happenings, which involve
ourselves or others in the common place telling of narratives. He explicitly links it to
the context of an “interrogation,” in either a courtroom or police station. An experi-
ment is certainly not an everyday life context, but may model one. As with all models
only certain feature carry from the model to the real situation – for example, a toy train
will model features like changing of tracks but not the workings of the engine. In
Mori’s case, the fact that there were direct parallels between the ‘real’ criminal case he
mentions and the experiment he ran testifies to its successful modeling features of
remembering occurring outside the laboratory.
316 Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:315–323
Another unique characteristic of Mori’s (2008) methodology is his focus on the
single case. This was a standard experimental practice in Pre-World War II European
psychology and was only displaced for non-scientific reasons (Toomela 2007). These
early methodologists believed that it was only by looking at the single cases that we
can construct a theory that applies universally. In contrast, Loftus’ (1975) work on
eyewitness testimony only shows a difference between two groups of participants, not
each participant. Thus, she cannot say with her findings which participants are
confabulating; but only that it will happen in some cases, some of the time.
On the one hand, a well designed experiment may be applicable to all cases. For
example, Ebbinghaus had only one participant in his sample (himself), and his results
have been easily replicated for over a hundred years now! But on the other, one might
still wonder about the validity of generalizing from a single case. It might be asked, how
can we see the diversity of thought forms in only one case? Mori (2008) partially solves
this problem by designing an experiment to create the conditions to study two dif-
ferent forms of remembering—remembering our embodied experience and remem-
bering another’s communication of their experience.
However, althoughMori’s (2008) experimental design is sufficient for his particular
goals, this approach in general leaves unexplored the diversity of ways in which
different participants might narrate their experience. Sample size should increase until
the sample reaches ‘saturation’, i.e. when the research ceases to discover anything new
by adding extra participants. Thus, if three distinct participants give the exact same
responses we can move on to another population or consider this sufficient for our
purposes. In the next section I will consider how we can make comparisons within a
sample to help us to explore individual cases.
Narrative in the Recall of ‘Apparent Behavior’
Mori’s (2008) use of single case analysis and multidimensional analysis of narrative
form should be commended. He shows that direct contact with the environment at first
only partially comes under the influence of narrative media; early narrations of the
experience will contain many features of the original embodied experience, such as
perception/action cycles (i.e. ‘alteration’), unstable descriptions of objects and the
motivation for action, whereas a retold narrative (either one’s own or another’s) tends
to smooth out these features to create a more linear, coherent and unified narrative
form. This is the direction of change narrative media afford.
I will argue here that this kind of analysis can also be fruitfully supplemented with an
analysis of both, the sample as a whole and the content of a narrative. To argue this I
will make use of data from a study conducted to explore the role of different narrative
frames in remembering (see Wagoner, in press). In this study I utilized Heider
and Simmel’s (1944) celebrated “apparent behavior” film, in which geometric shapes
(a big triangle, a little triangle and a circle) seem to interact with each other, such that
the film unfolds as a kind of story.1 Participants project a wide range of narratives onto
the film to familiarize it—for example, some saw it as a kind of domestic conflict. We
can call this the narrative content. It should be noted that this experiment misses the
1 The film can be watched online at: http://www.anthropomorphism.org/psychology2.html
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rich embodied experiences captured by Mori, but it can still help us to understand the
role of narrative in the transformation of experience while remembering.
In regards to narrative form, I classed participants into three groups, which I will
refer to as strong, weak and non-narrative framing. Strong narrative framing was
characterized by a temporal structure that spanned the whole sequence of events with
consistent characterization (stable descriptions of the shapes), developed relationships
between shapes and with intelligible motivations for actions. Weak narrative framing
participants lacked these features, while the two non-narrative framers did not see the
film as being about intelligent agents at all. A pattern quickly arose in which strong
narrative framers remembered more and transformed less events than weak narrative
framers. By ‘transformed’ I mean changed the order of events, substituted one shape
for another, or added an event to the story. Table 1 describes these differences.
To elucidate this narrative form and also to explore the analysis of narrative content,
let us consider a single case—that fits comfortably into the strong narrative framing
category. This participant remembered slightly less events than others in the category
but still more than the average for the weak narrative framers. And what she did
remember is totally accurate, i.e. there are no ‘transformations’.
There was a line drawing of a room, with a door. And there was a large triangle [T]
inside the room. And then a smaller triangle [t] and a circle [c] came along the
outside. Ok, so at some point the T sort of noised its way out the door. And I
remember thinking as I was watching this interaction this could be read in two
ways: either you could see the T coming out and being threatening towards the
other two or perhaps T is feeling threatened by the approach of these other two. I
wasn’t sure. But the c and t acted really differently. c seemed to be more afraid
and was moving away from T whereas t was very pointy and aggressive. They
were being quite aggressive to each other. And there was quite a bit of moving
about being pointy at each other. And, umm, at one point c ended up going inside
the room. And it kind of, looked like it was sort of hanging around. I don’t know
if I’m anthropomorphizing or what here. c seemed to be sort of watching what
was going on and sneaking, trying to get to a safe place, and went to the room.
But eventually T came back into the room. And c went straight to the corner
trying to get as far away from T as possible. It was not going to confront the
triangle like t was. And then t came in, I think. And there was more interaction
between those two. No, before t came in, T at first seemed to have its attention
focused still on t outside and then turned its attention to c, who was trying to get
away from it, then t came in, I think. And then engaged T more. And then,
everyone ended up outside. There was some chasing around the room. And, oh
goss how did it end up? Who ended up back in there? I can now not remember
Table 1 Differences between strong, weak and non-narrative framing
Number of participants Events remembered Transformations
Strong narrative framing 10 9 0.6
Weak narrative framing 8 6.5 2.13
Non-narrative framing 2 4 2.5
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after all this talking we’ve been doing whether T reclaimed its territory as it were.
Or [pause] I can’t remember how it ended.
This participant uses a territory conflict as her ‘schematic narrative template’ (Wertsch
2002), what I call a ‘narrative frame’, i.e. the underlining narrative structure that holds
the pieces together into a coherent whole. Later, I learned that she was highly involved
with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, though she was completely unaware that she was
using this structure to interpret and remember the events of the film. There is consistent
characterization of all the shapes, using the same names, attributing the same motives
and personalities, etc, and a consistent focus on the territory conflict throughout.
Specifically, she attends to who is responsible for the conflict and is quite clear from the
beginning that she will not take sides. Also, only her and one other participant (N=20)
held t partially responsible for the conflict. She also avoids saying T chased t and c, as
other participants did, preferring the vague, “there was some chasing”. The strong
framing of the film as a conflict over territory also seems to block her from remembering
the end of the film. She asks, “Who ended up back in there?” This is the logical ending
given her narrative template but it has nothing to do with the actual last events of the
film, in which t and c leave the screen and T spins around—in what looks like anger to
most—and “breaks” the rectangle into pieces.
It is only by comparing the participant’s narrative to the material that generated it that
we can analyze systematic qualitative changes in narrative content (see Wagoner 2007).
Bartlett (1932) was the first to master this methodology. He found that remembering
of stories was mediated by the social conventions of the society to which the par-
ticipant belonged. Thus, for the Native American story War of the Ghosts, British
participants readily changed ‘canoes’ into ‘boats’ and ‘hunting seals’ into ‘fishing’, as
well as omitting the foreign names and any references to the supernatural. These are
changes observed between the original and the reproduction; they cannot be observed
in the reproduction alone. What sets Bartlett apart from more recent memory experi-
ments is his focus on the single case and his openness to the systemic and qualitative
nature of changes that ensue in remembering: in the place of memory ‘distortion’ he
focuses on the ‘constructive’ aspects of change and how they might relate to the
participant’s life outside the laboratory. We are doing something similar in our analysis
of the above narrative: first, we analyze changes in a single case as organized and
meaningful; second, we consider them in light of the participant’s interests, history
and cultural background. But even Bartlett made analyses at the level of the general
sample—e.g. how many participants changed ‘canoes’ to ‘boats’—and further he uses
it to highlight cases deviant from the norm, e.g. only one out of 20 participants
remembered the proper names of the Native American villages. Let us now move
forward with this analytic strategy to highlight and explore a deviant case in the
current experiment on narrative form and content.
What We Can Learn from Deviance
Our deviant participant remembered slightly less than the average number of events for
strong narrative framing, however, she was the only participant in this classification to
transform three events. Her narrative is highly anthropomorphic with the use of words
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like “angry,” “alarmed” and “escaped”. Let us look at her elaborated narrative to
consider why three transformations might have taken place:
There was an angry triangle in a box. That hmmm opened the door to his box and
had a look outside and found a little triangle [t] and a circle [c], looked quite
playful. And then he started, pointed his little triangular face at them. And they
seemed quite alarmed and kind of being pushed away and then there, it seemed
like they were tricking him a bit. Then the other triangle [T] opened the door to
his hatch and snuck into his box and was in there for a while. And then, came
back outside again. And in the mean time, the baby triangle [t] had been pushing
the c around for a while. And at that point, I think, T went back into the box and
came out again. There was a lot of movement and c went into the box. T
followed him in. There seemed to be a lot of force at the point. So whenever T
pointed its pointy face c kind of got displaced to a different corner of the box, in
quite swift non-jagged movement. c left the box and T peered its head out and t
and c disappeared off the scene. And then T seemed to get really angry and
frustrated and smashed his box apart with his pointy face.
After her narration, the participant explains that Twas “a grumpy… quite old guy” and
the other two were “young playful characters” (both male). These characters get cast into
a master narrative centering on the single conflict of the youth joking around and
agitating the old (in the old’s territory). It is a kind of Denis the Menace (well known
American cartoon) narrative, in which Denis is always causing trouble to Mr. Wilson, in
his property, while Mr. Wilson becomes increasingly angry and frustrated. The form of
antagonism in this narrative is only surface deep—Denis and Mr. Wilson are in reality
quite attached. It is thus highly significant that her later comments, “at the end when they
[t and c] left the scene all together and T starting smashing his walls down, I thought that
he was actually quite upset that they’d gone. I think he missed them, despite it all.”
We get the sense from her narrative that Twants to be left alone, whereas both t and c
enjoy teasing him after they get over their initial alarm. T angrily pushes them away
when they disturb his peace and quiet and once they are out of the way he returns to his
own activities in his box, though he remains agitated. Thus we can explain many of her
omissions: she says nothing about the fight between T and t outside the box (nearly all
the other participants do), nor anything about the chase between T and the smaller shapes
(which over half of the participants mention something about). For her the conflict must
be understood as arising from t and c’s interference in T’s life and is settled as soon as T
pushes them out of his space. For this reason she is clear in the interview that c was just
as confrontational as t, which was a unique attribution in my sample (N=20).
Now that we understand the form and logic of her narrative, how should we interpret
the transformations that occur in it? She includes two cases of T entering and then
exiting his box alone. In the original this occurs only once after T has chased the other
two shapes. Also, in between these two events she inserts “the baby triangle had been
pushing c around for a while”. It is hard to know what to make of this attribution of
conflict—she is the only participant to think of t as “pushing” c around here. My
reading, based on her whole narrative framing, is that she interprets the event that
others see as t and c’s joyful reunion as playful fighting and includes it at this early
point to create a smoother narrative. However, it could also be argued that the event
was a mixing up of who had what roles in the fight between T and t. In any case, all
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three of these transformations fit her general narrative of T only being aggressive to a
point—t and c are also held responsible for causing trouble. Additionally, the
transformations help her to avoid including events that would not easily fit her
narrative frame, like T’s fighting with t at a distance from the house and c moving
away from the conflict. In fact, she makes the transition out of her confabulation to the
event where c enters the box with the very vague expression “there was a lot of
movement,” as if to cover up the unknown event. Similarly, c’s entering is interpreted
as motivated not from fear (which is the common causal connection made other
participants) but rather is another form of joking, i.e. playing with T’s things.
By attending to this deviant case, we see that it is not just a matter of strong and weak
narrative framing (i.e. narrative form) but also which narrative frame is used (i.e.
narrative content). A strong “domestic conflict” narrative frame does not tend to
produce transformations, nor as many omissions for this film. This frame seems to
map onto the sequence of events directly, whereas the Denise-the-menace narrative
frame can be used but requires a more active spinning of the frame to the sequence of
events to make it work, which results in a number of transformations.
Priming Participants with Particular Narrative Frames
To test and develop the findings of the experiment just described, I am now conducting
an experiment in which I give participants a narrative frame in advance, to interpret and
remember the film by. So, for instance, I tell participants I will show them a film about
“a territory conflict,” “a domestic conflict,” “a liberation from prison,” etc. I expected
that these different narrative frames would map onto the film in different ways, directing
what is remembered, forgotten and transformed for each narrative frame. Some of this
does seem to be taking place; however, the most significant change to occur is between
the above described experiment and the present one. Giving participants a narrative
frame in advance resulted in narratives in which much of the second half of the film was
left out (including events that the majority of participants included in the first
experiment) and for which there were several cases of generalization of events, in
which multiple events were summed up in a single event. This occurred even after I
gave much more explicit instructions to tell the story ‘step-by-step from beginning to
end’ (before this even more omissions were made).
Putting the two experiments together one can say that narrative reveals and conceals,
constrains and enables, transforms and stabilizes our experience and memory of it. This
is done to varying degrees depending on how strongly a participant is framing an
experience—the most strongly, in this case, would be those primed with a particular
narrative frame. Priming participants with a narrative puts a powerful constraint on the
form and content a narrative assumes in remembering; it sets up both a situation of
communication and a way of seeing the world.
Conclusion
In this paper I have celebrated Mori’s (2008) methodology in light of psychology’s
history and have elaborated upon it with two general methodological points: First, I
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have advocated a methodology that moves between individual case analysis and the
sample as a whole. It is only by working between these two that we can recognize
and begin to explain deviance. We should remain focused on the single case but use
aggregate statistics to help us tease apart the particular organization of a single case.
Second, I have argued that in analyzing narrative form we need not throw out an
analysis of narrative content; rather, we should simply consider narrative content
more flexibly than traditional memory researchers have done. Instead of labeling any
deviation from the original “distortion” or “false” memory (as if memory was a mark
left on the mind that faded in time) we should explore the qualitative nature of
changes in remembering, how it relates to the means of remembering (what narrative
frames are used and how strongly). By opening methodology for the study of
remembering in this way I hope to encourage other breakthroughs in the field
comparable to Mori’s important advances.
Acknowledgements This paper was written with the support of the Gates Cambridge Trust and the
Overseas Research Student Award Scheme. I must also thank Hala Mahmoud for her comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
References
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: a study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University.
Chase, S. (1995). Taking narrative seriously: consequences for method and theory in interview studies. In
R. Josselson, & A. Lieblich (Eds.), Interpreting Experience: The Narrative Study of Lives, V. 3 (pp. 1–
26). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Gergen, K. J., & Gergen, M. M. (1997). Narratives of the self. In L. P. Hinchman, & S. K. Hinchman
(Eds.), Memory, identity, community: The idea of narrative in the human sciences (pp. 161–184).
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behavior. The American Journal of
Psychology, 57, 243–259. doi:10.2307/1416950.
Loftus, E. F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 560–572.
doi:10.1016/0010-0285(75)90023-7.
Mori, N. (2008). Styles of remembering and types of experience: An experimental investigation of
reconstructive memory. Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 42, 3.
Toomela, A. (2007). Culture of Science: Strange History of the Methodological Thinking in Psychology.
Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 41, 6–20.
Wagoner, B. (2007). Overcoming psychology’s methodology: Finding synthesis beyond the American and
German-Austrian division. Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 1, 60–74. doi:10.1007/
s12124-007-9003-1.
Wagoner, B. (in press). Narrative in the recall of apparent behavior. In: S. Salvatore & T. Zittoun (Eds.),
Culture Psychology and Psychoanalysis in Dialogue. Issues for Constructive Theoretical and
Methodological Synergies. Rome: Firerq Publishing Group.
Wertsch, J. (2002). Voices of collective remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brady Wagoner is completing his Ph.D. in psychology at University of Cambridge, with the support of
the Gates Cambridge Trust and the ORS award. His main interests are the history of psychology,
sociogenetic thought (e.g. Bartlett, Janet, Mead, Vygotsky, etc.), various psychological philosophies (e.g.
322 Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:315–323
existentialism and pragmatism), the experimental study of perceiving and remembering, and the absurd
pursuit of mountain summits. He is on the editorial board of three international Journals (the International
Journal of Dialogical Science, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science and Psychology and
Society) and is co-creator of the F.C. Bartlett internet archive [accessed at: www-bartlett.sps.cam.ac.uk].
He is currently editing two books to be published in 2009: Symbolic Transformations: the mind in
movement through culture and society (Routledge) and Culture and Social Change: Transforming society
through the power of ideas (Information Age).
Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:315–323 323
